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The British government has been criticised for according industry interests
too much weight in alcohol policy-making. Consequently, it has been
argued that alcohol strategy in the UK is built around policies for which
the evidence base is weak. This has clear implications for public health. The
purpose of this commentary is to map recent developments in UK alcohol
policy and related debates within the alcohol policy literature, thus laying
the foundations for a systematic examination of the influence of the alcohol
industry on alcohol policy. It highlights the changing structure of the
industry and summarises what is known about the positions and strategies
of industry actors towards alcohol policy. In so doing, it aims to contribute
not just to debates about alcohol policy, but to a broader understanding of
health policy processes and the relationships between government and
other stakeholders. It advances a new research agenda focused on the role
of corporate actors in the field of alcohol policy and public health more
broadly.
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Introduction
This article addresses corporate influence on UK alcohol policy and its implications
for public health. UK alcohol policy is characterised by a multiplicity of agencies and
actors responsible for formulating and implementing various aspects of policy at
different levels of government, including at the EU level. Within the UK, alcohol
policy now falls under the remit of the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland, with some responsibilities retained by the UK Government.
In England, responsibility for alcohol policy is shared between various departments
including the Home Office and the Department of Health (DoH). The
Treasury, meanwhile, sets the levels of duty and Value Added Tax (VAT) on
alcohol across the UK.
It has been widely claimed that the UK government has afforded too prominent a
role to the alcohol industry in both the development and implementation of alcohol
policy (Room 2004, Baggott 2006). Despite some historical analyses of UK alcohol
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policy (see Greenaway 2003), this issue has received scant attention from those
studying current policy debates. Relatively little is known about the specific roles
played by alcohol industry actors in the policy process. This deficit is especially clear
when compared to the volume of literature which has emerged on the tobacco
industry (Holden and Lee 2009, Mosher 2009).
This article is intended as the first step in addressing the gap in current
scholarship. It maps the current state of UK alcohol policy, the architecture of the
alcohol industry, its policy positions and the political strategies it employs. As such,
it lays the foundations for an emerging research agenda on corporate influence on
alcohol policy in the UK and beyond. It speaks not just to alcohol policy specialists,
but to the wider public health community. Current debates in the public health
literature highlight the centrality of ‘lifestyle’ factors – including alcohol consump-
tion, smoking and obesity – in the new public health (Bell et al. 2011). As such, there
are clear implications for corporations whose products are associated with these
conditions. Furthermore, the ‘responsibility deals’ at the heart of the government’s
health policy in England give corporate actors a substantial say in policies to
improve the health status of the population (Department of Health 2011). If we are
to understand fully the public health challenges facing the UK, we require a more
detailed account of the specific mechanisms by which corporate actors influence both
the formation and implementation of policy. Whilst the focus of the current article is
principally at the national level – that is to say the constituent nations of the UK – an
emerging research agenda must take into account the implementation of policy at the
local and supra-national levels.
Developments in UK alcohol policy 2004–2010
Babor et al. (2003) define alcohol policy broadly as those measures aimed at
minimising the harms which result to both individuals and society as a result of
alcohol use. Between 2004 and 2010, the basis of alcohol policy in England was the
Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England (AHRSE) (Cabinet Office 2004). The
targeting of interventions on those sections of the public seen to be at greatest risk of
harm is a key theme. Education, public information, health and treatment services,
crime and disorder are placed at the centre of the strategy. Particular emphasis is
given to the role of the alcohol industry as key partners in achieving policy goals.
This involves a system of voluntary self-regulation, centred on bodies such as the
Portman Group and Drinkaware with very close links to the alcohol industry.
Possible future policy developments were prepared for with the DoH commissioning
researchers at the University of Sheffield to conduct an independent review of the
effects of alcohol pricing and promotion (Booth et al. 2008). This indicated that
‘minimum pricing might be effective as a targeted public health policy’.
The AHRSE was followed in 2007 by the publication of Safe Sensible Social: The
Next Steps in the National Alcohol Strategy (Department of Health 2007) which
reemphasised the general policy orientation of the AHRSE. It aimed to assist the
majority of the population to enjoy alcohol responsibly, accompanied by measures
targeted at the problematic minority of harmful drinkers. Like the AHRSE, the
updated strategy saw a prominent role for the alcohol industry in achieving these
policy goals.
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The focus on self-regulation led representatives of the drinks industry to
produce the Social Responsibility Standards for the Production and Sale of
Alcoholic Drinks in the UK (Advertising Association et al. 2005). An independent
review of the effectiveness of these social responsibility standards in reducing
alcohol-related harms found evidence of ‘many irresponsible and harmful
practices’ which contravened the standards and called for more effective
enforcement (KPMG 2008). A subsequent consultation mooted the possibility of
a mandatory code backed up by new legislation (Department of Health 2008a,b).
However, no further substantive changes were introduced by the Labour
Government in this area.
In May 2010, the new Conservative/Liberal Democrat administration established
a commitment in their coalition agreement to ensure policy ‘tackles binge drinking
without unfairly penalising responsible drinkers, pubs and important local indus-
tries’ (HM Government 2010, p. 14). This included a commitment to ban the sale of
alcohol below the level of Duty and VAT. Nevertheless, much of the previous policy
orientation remained. At the heart of the government’s health policy are a series of
‘responsibility deals’ which afford corporate actors a central role in shaping and
implementing policy and place responsibility for alcohol-related harm on the
individual consumer.
Debates in Scotland provide an interesting counterpoint to those in England. The
year 2008 saw the publication of the discussion paper Changing Scotland’s
Relationship with Alcohol (Scottish Government 2008), which set out proposals to
legislate for greater restrictions on the sale, promotion and pricing of alcohol. An
analysis of the submissions to this consultation was published the following year
(Scottish Government 2009a), along with a white paper setting out legislation which
included the introduction of a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol (Scottish
Government 2009b). This proposal was ultimately thwarted in a parliamentary vote
in the autumn of 2010, with the minority government unable to secure sufficient
cross-party support to pass the measures on MUP. However, alcohol pricing has
been identified as a key priority for the new Scottish National Party (SNP)
government elected in 2011.
Commentators have argued that the governments in both England and Scotland
have failed to implement effective harm reduction policies focusing on the pricing,
availability and promotion of alcohol. Instead policy has focused on approaches
such as public information and industry self-regulation for which the evidence base is
weak (Baggott 2010).
Similarly, it has been argued that alcohol policy under New Labour reflected the
party’s broader priorities and ideology, combining a concern with individual
responsibility in the areas of social and criminal justice policy with an overtly free-
market and pro-business economic policy (Room 2004, 2005, Baggott 2010).
In addition to a general disposition towards deregulation and marketisation, service
industries were recognised as an increasingly important sector of the economy.
Consequently, it was an explicit policy goal in this period to develop the leisure
industry and promote what is termed ‘the night-time economy’ (Hobbs et al. 2003,
Measham 2006, Baggott 2010). The strategic role of alcohol in developing the leisure
and tourism industries was reflected in the decision to transfer responsibility for
licensing to the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) following the
2001 general election.
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The structure of the alcohol industry
In order to understand the positions adopted by alcohol industry actors, they must
be placed in the context of the changing structure of the industry. Driven by falling
prices, there has been a trend in recent years towards increased off-trade sales for
drinking at home (Anderson 2007). Supermarket chains are responsible for an
increasing share of the market, selling alcohol at greatly reduced rates to attract
shoppers to their stores (Baggott 2010). Similarly, the gradual relaxation since the
early 1990s of constraints on both the number of licensed premises allowed in a given
area and the hours during which they are allowed to open has led to an increasing
concentration of licensed premises in town centres at the same time as the overall
on-trade market is contracting.
Economic liberalisation at the global level has facilitated growth in the alcohol
industry (Casswell and Thamarangsi 2009, Jernigan 2009), concentrating production
amongst a handful of multinational corporations (Giesbrecht 2000, Jernigan 2009).
Many of these number amongst the world’s largest corporations (Jernigan 2009).
Concentration of ownership and the increasingly competitive nature of the alcohol
industry have led to an increasing reliance by producers on marketing and
promotional activity (Giesbrecht 2000, Jernigan 2009). This is particularly the case
in mature markets such as the UK and the USA where increased competition has led
to a reduction in prices, encouraging corporations to pursue greater sales volumes to
protect their profits.
Policies promoted by the alcohol industry
The policy positions articulated by different sections of the alcohol industry vary on
issues including MUP and taxation, reflecting their underlying commercial interests.
Wine and spirit producers, for example, opposed MUP, whilst the brewing sector
was divided. Amongst retailers, the on-trade supported MUP, whilst the off-trade,
with some notable exceptions, was opposed. Despite these differences, there are a
number of common elements to the policies advocated by industry actors
(Giesbrecht 2000, Room 2006). A clear priority for both producers and retailers in
the UK has been to protect their ability to market their products as they wish.
Industry actors emphasise stakeholder involvement, self-regulation and partnership
with government in preference to legislation and mandatory codes of practice
(Anderson and Baumberg 2006). This involves an emphasis on corporate social
responsibility (CSR) and the production of industry standards of practice (see
Advertising Association et al. 2005, Portman Group 2006). The lessons learned from
research into the tobacco industry suggest that the CSR messages presented publicly
by industry actors may differ greatly from corporations’ real aims and objectives
(Fooks et al. 2011).
Underlying the alcohol industry’s policy agenda is the idea that responsibility for
reducing alcohol-related harm lies with the individual drinker, rather than the
industry or society more broadly (Room 2011). They emphasise the need for
personal responsibility, arguing that the majority of drinkers consume alcohol in
moderation. Consequently, policy interventions should be targeted at problem
drinkers. Despite strong evidence to the contrary, they argue that whole population
solutions penalise the ‘moderate majority’ whilst failing to address alcohol harms
(Room 2004, Anderson and Baumberg 2006; see also Casswell 1993). Instead, public
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information and schools education are promoted as the way to tackle alcohol-related
harm, a strategy with little supporting evidence (Anderson 2003, 2007, Babor et al.
2003, Room 2004, McCambridge 2007, Casswell and Thamarangsi 2009).
As Jahiel and Babor (2007) argue, it is unsurprising that the policies advocated by
alcohol industry actors differ from those policies advocated by public health
practitioners. What is remarkable is that current UK alcohol policies are far closer to
policies advocated by the alcohol industry than those indicated by the prevailing
evidence base. This may reflect government’s overtly economic (versus public health)
based approach to regulation and concerns that falls in consumption levels may
damage tax revenue or the ‘night-time economy’ (Adams et al. 2010, p. 588).
Given the orientation of current policy, it is noteworthy that there has been
relatively little research into the processes by which industry actors seek to influence
policy. Whilst much of the literature on alcohol policy exhibits a clear assumption
that industry actors are extremely powerful (Baggott 2006, Jernigan 2009), we know
relatively little about the processes of alcohol policy-making and the specific role
played by industry actors in these processes.
Alcohol industry strategy
Whilst there is limited literature on the current role of corporate actors in alcohol
policy, extensive analyses of tobacco industry internal documents demonstrate that
those companies have deployed a wide range of direct and indirect methods to
influence policy at all levels of government. Tactics have included the use of contract
lobbyists; campaign contributions to legislators and political parties; the provision of
gifts, honoraria, corporate hospitality and charitable donations; direct links with the
legislative and executive levels of government; alliances with other interest groups;
the use of front groups; the creation of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
initiatives; and attempts to undermine the scientific evidence on tobacco and health
(Givel and Glantz 2001, Holden and Lee 2009). The alcohol industry has strong
similarities to the tobacco industry in terms of its global reach, extensive financial
resources and the addictive nature of its products. There is evidence too that co-
ownership of alcohol and tobacco corporations (e.g. Phillip Morris and Miller) has
led both sectors to pursue similar policies and public affairs strategies (Bond et al.
2010). Thus there is a pressing need to scrutinise the political influence of alcohol
industry actors to a far greater degree than is currently the case.
A key strategy of the alcohol industry in recent years has been to achieve
partnership status with government agencies charged with reducing alcohol-related
harms (Casswell 2009). The discourse of partnership seeks to position the industry as
an integral part of the alcohol policy apparatus. In addition to its consultative role in
the policy making process – providing information and expertise to officials – the
industry claims it can play a role in the delivery of policy by performing various
regulatory and governance functions (Adams et al. 2010). In this way, partnership
agreements appear as mutually beneficial arrangements in which industry actors
share the burden of service provision with government agencies.
Much interest in the partnership based approach has centred on ‘Social Aspects
Organisations’ (SAOs) set up by the alcohol industry to promote its positions on
alcohol policy (Baggott 2010). In the UK, the Portman Group has played a crucial
role in the development of alcohol strategy. It was, for instance, the only ‘alcohol
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misuse’ organisation cited in the final version of the AHRSE (Harkins 2010).
In addition, Drinkaware, whose origins lie with the Portman Group, has been
afforded a prominent role in the public awareness and social drinking campaigns at
the heart of government strategy (Measham 2006).
Room (2006, p. 391) has argued that the key function of SAOs is ‘to claim a place
at the table in any open discussions on alcohol policy’, thus granting industry actors
direct access to the policy process. However, because of their ties to the industry,
SAOs cannot be regarded as neutral or objective participants (Giesbrecht 2000,
Anderson 2003). Whilst the drinks industry denies that SAOs are trade associations
or lobby groups, critics argue that they simply provide another avenue through
which to pursue policy aims (Anderson 2003, see also Room 2006, Casswell and
Thamarangsi 2009, Baggott 2010).
Industry actors attempt to frame issues and set agendas for policy makers in
order to influence their outcomes (Anderson and Baumberg 2006; cf. Baggott 1990,
Anderson et al. 2009). They claim that alcohol confers a net benefit on society
(Anderson 2003) and that policies ought to target high risk drinkers alone (Casswell
1993). This has meant suppressing information which runs counter to their narrative
(Adams et al. 2010) and sponsoring research which is favourable to their positions
(Babor 2009, Harkins 2010). This has led to a widespread debate about whether
scholars working in the field ought to accept funding from industry bodies (see
Anderson et al. 2009).
A new research agenda
This commentary paves the way for a new research agenda on the alcohol industry as
a political actor. This involves methodological challenges not encountered to the
same extent by researchers working on the tobacco industry, who have access to
internal industry documents. Research on the alcohol industry, and other industries
impacting on public health, needs to utilise publicly available documents, such as
those submitted to government consultations, and interviews with key players in the
policy process. The latter can involve both current and former ministers, Members of
Parliament, members of devolved parliaments and assemblies, civil servants, public
health advocates and industry actors. These interviews investigate the roles
corporations play in the policy process, the extent to which their input is sought
by government and the different avenues they pursue in order to represent their
interests.
Since this involves attempting to understand highly sensitive details of the
marketing and lobbying strategies of large multinational organisations at a time of
sustained political debate about the effects of alcohol on the UK, informants may be
particularly guarded in interviews. It is vital, therefore, that respondents are allowed
to participate anonymously and in strict confidence in order to facilitate both
participant recruitment and open discussion. By triangulating industry interview
responses with those of other policy actors, publicly available documents and
consultation responses, it should be possible to add to what little is known about the
role of corporate actors in the policy process. Comparisons with analyses of other
industries affecting public health such as the food, tobacco and pharmaceutical
industries will also be informative.
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The proposed methodology raises questions about the specific function of
interviews, the status of the data which they generate and the knowledge claims
which they can substantiate. This reflects broader epistemological debates within the
social sciences. From our perspective, interviews can provide important insights into
the ways in which industry actors construct the problem of alcohol related harm and
seek to influence policy responses through various means. Similarly, divisions and
cleavages may emerge between sectors and companies, leading to a more nuanced
understanding of policy debates. Comparisons between the role that industry actors
claim to play in the policy-making process and that attributed to them by policy
makers and civil society actors may also prove insightful.
Further questions arise also about the relationship between the new research
agenda and the policy process itself. Participation may be viewed by industry actors
as a way of furthering their policy objectives or projecting a specific image of their
company’s role in the policy process. Similarly, consideration must be given by
researchers working on such contentious issues to the role their research plays in
furthering certain policy agendas. Current debates about the criteria against which
public health research is judged and its ‘translation’ into policy are relevant to these
considerations (Mair and Kierans 2007, Crawshaw 2008, de Leeuw et al. 2008).
A research agenda of this kind would aim to examine the processes by which
public health policy is made, including when, how and with what degree of success
industry actors attempt to influence the content of government policies. It is
impossible, however, to separate entirely the discussion of policy process from the
substantive content of policies themselves. Recent debates in both England and
Scotland about the pricing and marketing of alcoholic products offer a useful case
study, which can also incorporate differences in policy processes between Scotland
and England. Research of this kind on the alcohol industry can not only inform our
understanding of the alcohol policies of the current and future governments but may
guide research into other health-related industries, such as the food industry, which
face similar methodological challenges.
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